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Abstract: The article analysis the most important cases within the jurisdiction of California 
regarding the trademark infringement and its prerogative of the likelihood of confusion. Finally, 
it compares the conclusion with the confusable marks theory within the Andean community‟s 
recent cases solving the issue.  
Keywords: Likelihood of confusion, Confusable Marks and Infrigement.  
Resumen: El artículo realiza un análisis jurisprudencial de los casos más relevantes de la jurisdicción de 
California con motivo del proceso calificativo o mejor determinativo de una violación al derecho marcario y la teoría 
de probabilidad de confusión dentro del mismo. Finalmente, se compara brevemente las conclusiones con la teoría 
de las marcas confusas de casos recientemente conocidos por el Tribunal Andino. 
Palabras clave: Probabilidad de Confusión Marcaria, Marcas confusas y Violación al Derecho Marcario. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This article contains a detailed analysis of the eight factors that should be considered in 
Common law in the Ninth District in California referring to the given judicial protection under 
section 15 USCA section 1125 in determination of trademark infringement. Then, it would be 
                                                          
1  Comentario jurisprudencial enviado el 28.03.2016 y aceptado el 15.05.2016. 
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the moment for a brief comparative analysis with the Andean Tribunal interpretation of 
Decision 486 of the year 2000. 
 
2.  The Ninth Circuit Likelihood of Confusion 
 
2.1.  Strength of the Protected Mark 
This factor consists of an objective threshold and a subjective intensifier requirement which 
weakens or strengthens the particular mark protection. The methodological exercise done by 
the court is deductive, beginning in a general conceptual categorization ending towards a 
particular commercial delimitation.  It could be the case that the Court would likely conclude 
that despite initially being conceptually suggestive a mark and therefore initially deserving only 
weak protection, it turns to, due to its commercial widespread nationally public recognition, to 
a strong protected mark. Therefore, “both the conceptual strength and the commercial 
strength of a mark are considered”2 “as initial matter”3.  
That particular conclusion was held thanks to the intensifier subjective catalytic agent as “for 
showing of secondary meaning” in Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard4. Then in explaining the 
threshold, a suggestive mark is in which a “subtly connote something about the product, 
although less distinctive than an arbitrary or fanciful mark and therefore a comparatively 
weak mark, a suggestive mark will be protected as it is without proof of secondary 
meaning because it is entitled to a restricted range of protection in the market. Thus, “only if 
the marks are quite similar, and the goods closely related, will infringement be found”.  Mark's 
strength elucidates a form of balancing test, because “commensurate with the degree of the 
consumer association proven”5. What results is that the more you prove the more you get, but 
without changing the conceptual essence of the mark, it goes further from its natural spectrum 
of protection. At the end the court addresses a) the requirements you need to proof to get 
protection change and b) the range of protection of the mark6.  
A strong mark, inherently distinctive mark, affords the widest ambit of protection from 
infringing uses when association of the origin in the marketplace “neither suggest nor describe, 
and there is no need to describe secondary meaning. On the other hand a weak mark is 
descriptive because it says something about the product and it will be protected only when 
                                                          
2  Groupion, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 859 F.Supp.2d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
3  E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co. 
4  775 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2014), 279 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). 
5  Norm Thompson Outfitters Inc. v Generals Motors Corp .448 F2d 1293-1295 (CA 9 1971- Applying Oregon Law cited by  AMF 
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341. 9th Cir. 1979 ) and in Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co., Inc., 2013 WL 142877 (C.D. Cal. 
2013). 
6  AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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secondary meaning is shown”. Conceptual strength, in turn, depends on the mark's 
characterization in the standard consumer: the strongest marks are “arbitrary” ones and 
“suggestive” marks; the weakest are “descriptive” and “generic” marks. „„Commercial strength 
is based on „actual marketplace recognition and thus advertising expenditures can transform a 
suggestive  mark into a strong mark.‟‟7.   
 Additionally, this factor does not play in isolation from the others, because it is considered a 
weak mark when “where there has been extensive third party use of similar marks on similar 
goods”8. Nevertheless, it should first be remembered that whether it is similar or not depends 
on the second factor because “in situations in the case of almost identical products and 
services the strength of the mark is one of diminish importance”9. For instance, in the Sleekcraft 
case it was held that a recreational boat differs from a high-speed boat, therefore they were not 
similar and as consequence of that, the protection was limited. Also in “Groupon” which 
suggest “coupon” demonstrates the use of similar marks in the relevant industry as well as the 
lack of Groupion‟s commercial strength in the United States, the significantly undermines the 
strength of its mark. In POM, protection went to plaintiff , not to defendant as in Gruopion  
because the Court found that „„POM‟‟‟s suggestive commercially strong, considering the 
national scope as leading supermarket seller of 100% pomegranate juice and marketing efforts;  
then as  oppose to “Slickraft” related energy beverages sells where also restricted. 
 
2.2.  Proximity and relatedness of the goods 
In determining whether or not goods are related, the Ninth Circuit considers the following:   
Proximity of goods means that the public will unmistakably assume that “there is an 
association between producers” when there is not really such association because the goods are 
“related”. That would be enough to test competing products but in a not-competing context 
they have to be “similar” or “extremely close in use and function”10. “Extremely close related 
circumstances are a) complementary product; b) products sold to the same class of purchases 
and; c) products similar in use and functions”11.  
If there is a product that is “nearly identical in sight and sound” the only defense allowed is 
that “the product must be “substantially different”. The Ninth Circuit examined two beverages 
made of pomegranate or pomegranate flavored, single-serve, and marketed for their healthy 
benefits. Although one was energy drink and the other a 100% juice beverage, the Court 
decided that the “use and function” of the beverages were “clearly related.” Similarly, in 
                                                          
7  Groupion, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 859 F.Supp.2d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
8  Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co., Inc., 2013 WL 142877 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
9  Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co. Inc., 2013 WL 142877 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
10  AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341. 9th Cir. 1979. Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1147. 
11  Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2014) 99. 
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Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co., Inc.12, the federal district court, said that “both parties sell 
fitness and athletic focused clothing for women,” “foundational similarity” was sufficient for 
the second factor to favor the plaintiff. 
 
2.3.  Type of Goods and the Degree of Consumer’s Care 
The Court concludes that divergent prices of products and services weight against finding 
likelihood of confusion, because the consumer does use more care and rely less on the brand‟s 
name. In determining whether there is care of the consumer, the Ninth Circuit considers that 
when goods are expensive, it is “assumed that buyers will exercise greater care in their 
purchases. Unlike purchasers of expensive goods—whom we expect to be more discerning 
and less easily confused, purchasers of inexpensive goods „„are likely to exercise less care, thus 
making confusion more likely13. If there are high quality goods or services the court has found 
that it is also important because “the hallmark of a trademark owner‟s interest in preventing 
use of his mark on related goods is the threat such use poses to the reputation of his own 
goods”14.  In Slickraft, when buying an expensive boat the buyer can be expected to exercise 
greater care in his purchases. On the other hand in the Gallo case, products and services were 
inexpensive so that consumers tend to exercise less care when purchasing their lower cost 
items of “wine and cheese”, and thus consumer rely more on brand names. Similarly, POM 
beverages cost between $1.99 and $2.49, therefore the consumer is expected to exercise a 
lower care. In those cases alike Athleta, the court found that the parties‟ goods are “not so 
divergent” in price so that costumers exercise sufficient care in making their purchase. Finally 
in between those degrees of cares there is the case of Entrepeneur where divergent prices such 
as the news stand magazine at $3,95 compare to the $10,000 year subscription from an „„small 
business owners seeking public relations services, advertisers and media entities will make 
them exercise a moderate degree of care.‟‟ EntrepreneurPR‟s services were expensive and 
media entities a moderately sophisticated class of media consumers;‟‟15.  
 
2.4.  Similarity of the protected mark and the allegedly infringing mark 
In determining whether or not goods are similar, the Ninth Circuit considers that “this factor 
is always important in determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists because when 
„„marks are entirely dissimilar, there is no likelihood of confusion‟‟16. In doing this 
determination, „„the marks must be considered in their entirety and as they appear in the 
                                                          
12  2013 WL 142877 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
13  AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
14  AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
15  Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). 
16  Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 20141). 
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marketplace;‟‟ (2) „„similarity is adjudged in terms of appearance, sound, and meaning;‟‟ and (3) 
„„similarities are weighed more heavily than differences17. In addition, where the parties offer 
competing goods, a lower level of similarity will suffice to support a finding of a likelihood of 
confusion. It should be taking in to account however, the focus is confusion with respect to 
the source of a product or service18, as generally refer within the industry19. Finally the gradual 
encroachment onto plaintiff's protected marks could greatly increase the similarity of the 
marks as they are encountered in the marketplace for consumers20. For instance, in  Athleta  
case the Court found  that  lettering of the marks differs only by inclusion of the “ic” in 
defendants' mark, and the “c” is partially obscured by the three-petal leaf design that 
defendants have adopted. “This leaf design shares minimal elements of plaintiff's pinwheel 
design, including the use of a purple color with petal-shapes anchored by the center. Even 
viewing these marks in isolation, the marks bear significant similar.”  In contrast, in the 
Gruopion case, despite the similarity in the spelling of the two words, the Court finds that the 
marks, when viewed in their entirety and as they appear in the marketplace, are dissimilar. The 
Court refers, “Groupion regularly presents its mark in two colors, with the „„group‟‟ in black 
and the „„ion‟‟ in green. All of the letters are outlined in white and the mark is on a grey back- 
ground. The mark is frequently followed by the tag line „„Business Groupware and CRM for 
the Cloud‟‟. In contrast, Groupon‟s mark is typically all capitalized, all of the letters are in the 
same white color, the letters are in a thicker font, and the word appears on a black background. 
Moreover, Groupon does not display other marks or words with its mark. Additionally is a 
three-syllable word, while Groupon is a two syllable one. However, they were created by 
different words and, thus, imply different meanings. Nevertheless, there was no “confusion on 
the source”. It is important the Gallo case because independently of wine and cheese origin in 
different factories, it is really marketed within the winery industry as one product, the winery 
industry is connected to the mark as the source of the cheese and wine. 
 
2.5.  Marketing channel convergence 
Whether the marks in dispute do overlap or not in their market channels is the issue under 
scrutiny by the Ninth Circuit in examining this factor. This factor is concerned with “where, 
how and to whom the parties products are sold” but also include the advertising, the existence 
of direct competition and retail distribution”21. Marketing channels can converge even when 
different sub- markets are involved so long as „„the general class of purchasers exposed to the 
products overlap”22. Interestedly, neither of these factors merits little weight given the broad 
                                                          
17  Groupion, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 859 F.Supp.2d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
18  Groupion, LLC v. Groupon, Inc. 
19   E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 2002). 
20  Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co., Inc., 2013 WL 142877 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
21  Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co., Inc., 2013 WL 142877 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
22  AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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use of the internet today23, nor its limited the marketing to the same stores or agents24. Finally, 
if they are in the same market they should be „„essentially interchangeable, inexpensive and 
disposable”25. Setting the example for modern technology use to the fail to submit any 
evidence of overlapping was ruled when “Groupon did not participate in these events and has 
not participated in any tradeshows for the business software industry. Moreover, Groupon 
engages in substantial television, radio, and billboard advertising. Groupion does not”. In 
finding overlapping of marketing channels, in Pom was find out that, first, both companies sell 
their products in supermarkets located throughout the wide national level, both companies 
marketed to health conscious consumers and overlap channels of marketing regardless broader 
range of outlets. In Entrepreneur, it was explained that the use of the internet does not, by itself, 
mean overlapping because “the proper inquiries are 1) whether both parties use the web as a 
substantial marketing and advertising channel, 2) Whether the marks are utilize in conjunction 
with web based products and 3) whether the channels overlap in any other way. In this same 
case where there was non-pertinent use of the we, it was found that the magazine marketing 
was targeting horizontally and upstream as business seeking public relationships rather than as 
simply individual readers downstream. Additionally, in entrepreneur the publication did not 
compete for subscribers, newsstand purchasers or advertisements because entrepreneur 
illustrated is not for sale and does not feature paid advertisement. When it was that 
pomegranate juice was in the same market notwithstanding they were in different stores, it was 
found that products converge within the same market. 
 
2.6 Evidence of Actual Consumer Confusion 
In determining whether or not actual confusion was proved, the Ninth Circuit prays that the 
Evidence of actual confusion is relevant to the issue of likelihood of confusion, but the 
absence of such evidence need not create an inference that there is no likelihood of confusion. 
The Ninth Circuit has stated that surveys in trademark cases are to be admitted as long as they 
are conducted according to accepted principles26. „„Evidence of actual confusion is strong 
evidence that future confusion is likely‟‟. A reasonable juror may, however, find actual 
confusion unpersuasive as to the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion27. In the Entrepeneur 
case, because of the descriptive nature of EMI‟s mark, consumers in encountering marks using 
the same term, do not necessarily assume a connection with Entrepreneur but instead try „„to 
carefully pick out one from the other. Credibility of the witnesses on evidence such as that 
presented here is not a matter appropriate on summary judgment. To constitute trademark 
infringement, use of a mark must be likely to confuse an appreciable number of people as to the 
                                                          
23  Groupion, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 859 F.Supp.2d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
24  Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2014). 
25  Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2014). 
26  E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 2002). 
27  Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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source of the product. In Gallo, it was stated that actual confusion was at least 40% nationally 
and at least 47% in California. The Field Survey consisted of interviews with nearly 3500 adult 
shoppers in 35 different shopping malls throughout the United States. The interviewees were 
shown photographs of Joseph's cheese label, and asked a series of questions, three of which 
related to confusion. The responses were coded improperly but still admissible and weighted 
those technical unreliability28.  
 
2.7.  Defendant’s intent in selecting the allegedly infringing mark 
When the alleged infringer knowingly adopts a trademark similar to another‟s, reviewing courts 
presume that the defendant can accomplish his purpose, which is that the public will be 
deceived; the point is not that an intent to confuse is relevant as some measure of culpability, 
but rather than the alleged infringer‟s judgment as to what is likely to be confusing is relevant 
because it may well be accurate29. Evidence of the defendant‟s intent to confuse customers or 
of product expansion is not required for a finding of likelihood of confusion30. The absence of 
any proof regarding actual confusion, the defendant‟s intent, and the product expansion does 
not affect our likelihood of confusion analysis31. For example, the Court in Gallo explained 
that it is reluctant to preclude an individual's business use of his own name when no 
attempt to confuse the public has been made but not until the point that he knew “that the 
Winery would object to his use of the Gallo name and that he intended to capitalize on its 
reputation and selling power”. On the other hand in Slickaft case there was no evidence that 
defendant knew and tried to pal off  the plaintiff , furthermore when he realized he tried to 
change the appearance, but never mind there was the case of an infringement . 
 
2.8.  Likelihood of Product Expansion 
Inasmuch as a trademark owner is afforded greater protection against competing goods, a 
“strong possibility” that either party may expand his business to compete with the other will 
weigh in favor of finding that the present use is infringing32. When goods are closely related, 
any expansion is likely to result in direct competition. Similarly, evidence of the defendant‟s 
intent to confuse customers or of product expansion is not required for a finding of likelihood 
of confusion33. 
                                                          
28  Athleta, Inc. v. Pitbull Clothing Co., Inc., 2013 WL 142877 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
29  Lanham Trade-Mark Act, § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A.§ 1125(a)(1), also cited in Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
30  Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). 
31  Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2014). 
32  Restatement of Torts § 731(b) & Comment c. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
33  Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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In POM case, the absence of any proof regarding actual confusion, the defendant‟s intent, and 
product expansion does not affect the likelihood of confusion analysis. Pom Wonderful‟s lack 
of evidence with respect to these factors neither undermined nor advanced its ability to prove 
likelihood of confusion. Furthermore, the evidence of the foundational premises in Slickraft 
case shows that both parties were diversifying their model lines of boats. The potential that 
one or both of the parties will enter the other's submarket with a competing model was 
strong34. In Gallo it was found that the expanding to the cheese retail market by defendant was 
the relevant fact rather than plaintiff moving to the whole sale market. And in the same regard, 
in Gruopion case was hold that a juror could not find that a business which needs 
comprehensive customer management software would turn to Groupon because what is 
relevant is the substance of the two companies‟ respective products and services, not the 
characterizations or labels offered by the parties regarding the products and services. 
 
3.  The Andean Tribunal Confusable Marks Approach 
 
Initially the protection of “confusable” marks in the Andean Tribunal is restricted in to those 
products written in the application form of registration according to the Niza categorization35. 
Nevertheless, whether judicial and administrative controls are exercise within the boundaries 
of the ius prohibendi would depend on what it is extracted from the idea of   a “confusable 
good” within the clearing house of the due process and fair trail. The confusable goods are 
those, which conform to three essential factors. The factors, which describe a confusable 
good, are relatedness, similarity and distinctiveness. Finally there is an additional layer of 
protection by showing that there is “market coexistence”36.  
Moving to the Andean does not make it California but a parallel in the analysis of the eight 
factors could be made, despite conflicting statements arise. Let‟s say we have eight Californian 
factors that would fill within those three different layers of the Andean Community. First, it 
might be a derail from “strict distinctiveness” towards the second consideration of the layer of 
confusable goods which might increase the relevance of “relatedness”. Who knows what 
would happen because simply a strong mark with full protection is granted by the fact of clear 
matching with the registration of goods. Just secondly, confusable goods protection is 
abrogated to the relatedness, similarity and distinctiveness. Finally, as an additional but not 
essential factor, it would be render protection when market coexistence is exhibit. 
                                                          
34  AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
35  Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 10-IP-94. 
36  Tribunal de Justicia Andina, Proceso No. 12-IP-96. 
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 In conclusion, the interpretation given to the term “market coexistence” is crucial when 
determining the level of protection within the Andean Community to similar, related and 
distinctive registered marks. For instance, if taking “coexistence” as meaning an “overlapping” 
market, when there is the case of not having enough distinctiveness because it is considered a 
weak mark, then overlapping would determine if there is infringement to those segments of 
the overlapping market. If there is not enough relatedness because of non-competitors or not 
enough similarity in their entirety, then only the proof of overlapping will ascertain protection. 
Following that same logic, the infringement would be allocated when there is not entire 
similarity. Nonetheless, the Andean Decision 486 article 186 literal h) and 226 literal a), b) and 
c) gives several objectives that were used to interpret the term “market coexistence” broadly37. 
In the recent interpretation the Tribunal indirectly states that any “market coexistence” should 
avoid, confusion, association, dilution and parasite risks. The assessment of those risk open a 
window to ensure protection of not completely confusable goods just by adding proof of any 
of the other 8 factors mentioned in California. This is which appears to be an exclusion to 
challenges against the likelihood of confusion for fair use allegations. In conclusion, there is a 
high burden for plaintiff in the Andean community but it would be grant a higher range of 
protection without restrictions. It could be that following the last interpretation, the plaintiff 
must prove distinctiveness, similarity and relatedness, but also exclude any fair use just by 
proving the risk of parasite, association, confusion and dilution of the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37  Tribunal Andino 109- IP-2012. 
